1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	NORTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA
3	Cynthia D. Pajak,
4	Plaintiff,
5	vs. CIVIL ACTION NO.
6	1:19-cv-160
7 8	Under Armour, Inc., Under Armour Retail, Inc., and Brian Boucher,
9	Defendants.
	Delendants.
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11	Proceedings had in the motion hearing of the above-styled action on July 21, 2021, before Honorable Michael J. Aloi, Magistrate Judge, in Clarksburg, West Virginia, via Zoom video
13	conference
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1 Wednesday Afternoon Session, 2 July 21, 2021, 3:00 p.m. 3 4 THE CLERK: This is the matter of Cynthia D. Pajak 5 versus Under Armour, Inc. et al., Case Number 1:19-CV-160. 6 This matter comes on for a hearing on motions of plaintiff and 7 defendant regarding discovery. 8 Will counsel please note their appearance for the 9 record. 10 MS. SMITH: Amy Smith and Larry Rector for the 11 plaintiff, Cynthia Pajak. 12 MS. HURNEY: Good afternoon. Grace Hurney and Justin 13 Harrison, Jackson Kelly, on behalf of the Under Armour 14 defendants. 15 MR. KAMINSKI: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is 16 Scott Kaminski on behalf of defendant Brian Boucher. 17 THE COURT: Mr. Kaminski, I don't see you by video, 18 so you're just by phone; is that correct? 19 MR. KAMINSKI: I am, Your Honor. I expected to be back in Charleston in time for this hearing, but I am not, and 20 21 out of respect for the Court, I did not have access to a jacket 2.2 and tie right now. 23 THE COURT: You are fine. I can hear you well. 24 Ms. Askew, you were going to introduce yourself. 25 MS. ASKEW: Yes, Your Honor. Good afternoon. Amy Cindy L. Knecht, RMR/CRR/CBC/CCP

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Askew on behalf of the Under Armour defendants.

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THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, counsel.

So as a matter of logistics, I'm first going to address a motion the -- the plaintiff's motion to compel full and complete responses to discovery requests, and that has to do with ECF Number 466. And as you know, just, I think, yesterday or the day before, Judge Keeley also referred motions to me that were actually filed by the parties before this one, but she didn't refer them to me until yesterday, although they've been fully briefed.

I intend to do my best to address everything, because I've already had the benefit of your briefing. We're getting -- I'm hearing myself again. It has stopped. No, it hasn't.

Although it's not in order as the motions have been filed, I know my law clerk talked with the parties and they're prepared to address ECF Number 466 first because that was the first one that was referred to us.

And so in regard to Under Armour, who's going to, at least initially, be speaking to the motion to compel in response, ECF Number 466?

MS. HURNEY: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Grace Hurney. I will be addressing Number 466.

NATHAN FETTY: Your Honor, this is Nathan. Let me jump in for a second, please. I think it may be helpful if

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everybody who's not speaking could mute themselves. Let's try -- so Grace, if you would stay -- if you're going to be arquing, yeah, thank you, Larry or Amy. Let's have Amy and Justin unmuted and see if that helps. And everybody else muted. THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Fetty. Well, I do have -- I do want to speak to the plaintiff first in regard to ECF Number 466, so if everyone other than Mr. Rector and Ms. Smith would mute themselves, and then we'll continue. So I have a few questions -- are you going to handle it, Ms. Smith? MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: So let me --NATHAN FETTY: Judge, I'm sorry to interrupt. If Mr. Kaminski, if he hasn't, could mute on his end with his telephone connection, that would be helpful, too. MR. KAMINSKI: I was muted and I will do it again. NATHAN FETTY: Just want to make sure. Thank you. THE COURT: So Ms. Smith, there is a motion to compel in regard to documents re the theft of Boucher's laptop computer in 2018. I have a note that you -- Under Armour has supplemented their discovery and this is no longer in dispute. Is that correct, or am I missing something? MS. SMITH: Your Honor, with regard to that first

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request made in Mr. Rector's letter of June 14th, it is correct that the -- just on Monday of this week, we received a supplementation that included some documentation that the laptop had been -- I'm trying to find the document here, but that the laptop had been stolen from an airport in Bogota, Colombia, I believe. We received three pages Bates numbered Under Armour 7175, 7176, 7177, and 7178, so four pages regarding that.
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There is a reference in here that Mr. Boucher or his manager needs to submit a stolen report. We don't have the stolen report, but we do have a few emails from Mr. Boucher indicating that his laptop had been stolen from an airport in Bogota, Colombia.

THE COURT: Let's stop on that one. I now want to hear from Ms. Hurney. Do you know whether such a report exists, the stolen report?

MS. HURNEY: I do not know, Your Honor, if that exists.

I would like to make a quick point of clarification. Those documents were formally supplemented recently, but they were provided previously in an informal fashion, given the testimony regarding Mr. Boucher's laptop.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. You broke up a little in the beginning, so have you all looked for a formal report like a stolen item report and it doesn't exist, or you

can't find it?

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MS. HURNEY: Your Honor, I do not believe we have looked for it. That can be something that we can do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, to the extent -- I know it was mentioned in your documents. If it can be supplemented with that report, again, I mean, from the Court's perspective, you've, I think, probably documented it sufficiently to verify that it was stolen and where it was stolen from, but it references a report, so to the extent that can be found and provided, I would direct you all to do so. And then we'll go -- did you have anything else to say about that, Ms. Smith?

MS. SMITH: Not with regard to the laptop that apparently was stolen from the airport in Bogota, Colombia.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, that's fine.

We're going to go next to reports created by Steven Kitchen about audits of UA's legal hold room. Why don't you go ahead and represent to the Court why you think that is relevant and why you think it does not violate the attorney-client privilege.

MS. SMITH: Absolutely, Your Honor.

With regard to Mr. Kitchen's audits of the legal hold room, Mr. Kitchen testified at his deposition that the Boucher laptop was in the legal hold room. He testified as follows, Your Honor: That the laptop was in the legal hold room that he

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maintains and audits every quarter for our legal team. And it was one of those laptops in there. How it got in there, I don't know. And then he goes on and he says -- Mr. Rector asked him: Okay, and you say you maintain and audit that room. does an audit entail for that room? He answered, and this is on page 72 of his deposition transcript: I'll get a list of teammates, things like that, that are supposed to be in there that are not supposed to be in there any longer, and I audit these -- these rooms and send my findings back to Mike Maryanski and also the legal team. So this is a question, so it's: Let me make sure I understand that. It's an audit of those persons who have access to the room? Answer: No. It's just an audit of equipment that is in that room. And then he says, in response to a question: Are there reports of these audits? Mr. Kitchen responded: Recently, yes. Mr. Rector asked: Were there in 2019? He says he was not in that role in 2019. And he says: You got into the role. Were you aware that reports of that type had been created by Under Armour? No. He testified that that was something that he initiated.

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The question: Is that something that you initiated when you became part of that role?

And Mr. Kitchen said: Yes. So the process changed

when I came into this role. Instead of it going to security and then going to me and then being held in a room, it would go from the HR directly to me. It gets held in the legal hold room and gets documented on a sheet.

THE COURT: So let me interrupt you now. Kitchen testified that as far as he was aware, reports -- he didn't start doing this and start creating reports until when?

MS. SMITH: He started creating reports in 2019, Your Honor, or -- he took on the role in late 2019 and began in late 2019 or early 2000 -- I'm sorry. End of '20, beginning of '21. I'm sorry, Your Honor.

THE COURT: I understand what he said, so tell me why it's relevant and then why you think it does not violate attorney-client.

MS. SMITH: Absolutely, Your Honor. He testified in response to the question: So there would be some documentation at the end of '20 or the first of 2021 that shows this Boucher laptop being in that room?

Answer: Correct.

Question: And that hasn't been produced, has it?

Answer: I couldn't answer that question.

It hasn't been produced, Your Honor. And Mr. Kitchen

1 testified that he was the one who initiated this process. 2 testified that he --3 THE COURT: You don't need -- I'm sorry. Excuse me, 4 Ms. Smith. You don't need to read any more of his deposition. 5 In fact, if anyone recalls, I was present and listening to it. 6 So let me ask you something, Ms. Hurney. Do such 7 reports exist? Is there a way to produce such reports that 8 would redact everything other than whether Boucher shows up in 9 this room or not, according to Mr. Kitchen's report? Have you 10 seen one? MS. HURNEY: Your Honor, if we were to redact the 11 12 report to only show any reference to Mr. Boucher, we would be 1.3 redacting the whole report, Your Honor. Mr. Boucher is not on 14 the list for this spreadsheet. 15 THE COURT: Okay. So Boucher does not show up on the 16 spreadsheet which basically Kitchen calls his report? 17 MS. HURNEY: Yes, Your Honor, that is correct. 18 THE COURT: And I was listening to his deposition. 19 What I understood that to meant was he has a spreadsheet that says there's 20 laptops in the hold room and it may say who 20 21 they belong to. What you're representing to me, Ms. Hurney, on 2.2 the record, is that there are no reports or spreadsheet that 23 would show that his laptop was in the hold room? 24 MS. HURNEY: The report does not have Mr. Boucher 25 listed on the hold room, Your Honor. It does not. And we're

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happy to submit that in camera, if you would like to examine it.

THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. I'm going to direct you to submit them in camera.

And I think that you can assume for purposes of the record, Ms. Smith, that if the Court does not produce them, then Mr. Boucher is not listed on those lists and in the hold room, as represented by Ms. Hurney.

So if we do that, Ms. Smith, what else is there left to do in regard to that request?

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, the request was not limited to Mr. Boucher. It involves Ms. Pajak and her laptop, which also should have been in the legal hold room, although Mr. Kitchen testified with regard to her laptop that it was not in the legal hold room, but it's plaintiff's position that either the presence or absence of the laptops in the litigation hold room is relevant evidence of spoliation the plaintiff is entitled to. And so without regard as to whether the laptops or a particular laptop is on a particular list at a particular time, it's relevant to plaintiff's claims of spoliation. The audit list --

THE COURT: I understand your argument. No. I understand it.

Ms. Hurney, I assume when you send me that, I will not see Boucher's name, or Pajak's, and if I do, I'll provide

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it to the plaintiff. Is that correct?
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               MS. HURNEY: That is fair, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               So Ms. Smith, you will have this record as well as
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     the Court indicating that I've reviewed them in camera and
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     there is no reference either to Pajak or Boucher. You don't
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    need to know about anyone else. The other ones are not your
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     case. And if I tell you that they're not there, then you will
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     then have that evidence. So what else would you need in regard
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     to those reports?
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               MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. That's sufficient.
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               THE COURT: Okay. I'm still getting --
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               NATHAN FETTY: Your Honor, I'm going to see what else
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     I can do.
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               THE COURT: I lost everyone, by the way.
               NATHAN FETTY: Everybody's still here, Judge, on my
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     end.
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               THE COURT: I'm not seeing them. There we are.
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               So Ms. Hurney, you will produce those to me, and the
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     Court will review and then report whether Boucher or Pajak are
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     listed.
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               Now, let's go to item number three, talks about Webex
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     Teams chat logs, about efforts to locate Pajak's laptop. I
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    have a note that those documents -- or there has been a
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     response and they have been produced.
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Is that correct, Ms. Smith?

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MS. SMITH: Your Honor, they have -- the defendant has produced three pages of Webex Team chat notes, Bates

Numbered 7368, 7369, and 7370, on Monday of this week. But that is not sufficient to satisfy the request. This is a situation where during Mr. Kitchen's deposition he referred to the Webex Team chats in a particular context of a conversation that he had with his boss regarding Ms. Pajak's laptop, I believe, and he identified that it was not through email; it was through a Webex Teams chat.

And Mr. Rector asked what the Webex Team chat feature was. This is on page 98 and 99 of Mr. Kitchen's deposition, and Mr. Rector indicated: Because we have nothing, not a single chat in the case that's been prepared by Webex Teams. And this is a whole other means of communication that apparently has not been searched in responding to any discovery requests.

So Mr. Rector asked later in the deposition, beginning on page 151 and 152, what this Webex Teams chat function was, and discovered that Webex Teams is a system that Under Armour corporate has used for -- has used that system being mid-2020, and that he uses it, Mr. Kitchen uses it, every day; that most employees -- corporate employees of Under Armour use Webex Teams chat because they kind of taught us to use that system and to kind of stay away from email because things get

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lost in inboxes. So for corporate teammates the majority of it use Webex Teams or --

THE COURT: Ms. Smith, excuse me. I understand what Webex is. We use it here in the federal court system. It's IM. It's like internal text messages.

Ms. Knecht, I'm sorry about this. If the echo is bothersome, please remind me and I'll repeat myself.

So I understand what it is. I don't even know if it's capable of being preserved, but first of all, who is Mike Maryanski, Ms. Smith? Who is Mike Maryanski?

MS. SMITH: I'm sorry, Your Honor. We're muting our phone between speaking, so it takes me a minute. I apologize.

But Mr. Maryanski, Mr. Kitchen testified, is the person who's an Under Armour employee who he reports to. So he has a report on the Under Armour side and another one on his HCL side. If you recall, Mr. Kitchen is embedded.

THE COURT: Okay. And, of course, you now have Ms. Pajak's computer, which you all are going to do forensic exam on on July 23rd, correct?

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, it is correct that arrangements are being made to travel to Baltimore to view Ms. Pajak's laptop, but that is not sufficient evidence with regard to this spoliation claim. In the first instance, I believe this is relating to the spoliation of Mr. Boucher's laptop, but Ms. Pajak's laptop was not preserved through any

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kind of legal hold. It was not produced or acknowledged that it existed until after the close of discovery.

THE COURT: I'm familiar with that, Ms. Smith. I do want to ask you some questions about that.

First of all, at least from my history with the case, Ms. Pajak was concerned about her employment situation and was communicating with counsel, Mr. Rector, well before her discharge ever happened. And, in fact, the Court prohibited Under Armour from having any access to those communications between herself and Mr. Rector.

I just -- I can't imagine that Ms. Pajak wouldn't have preserved everything on her own computer that would support her claim, and this is her computer. She would have preserved everything that she felt supported her claim and would have shared it with her attorneys, because they were involved over nine months before she was ever discharged. And so I don't know what it is you expect to find that she wouldn't have known about in advance. So can you help me with that?

NATHAN FETTY: Your Honor, before Ms. Smith responds, let me just jump in here about this echo. It seems to be an issue whenever the courtroom and the Steptoe connection are both unmuted. So we really need Ms. Smith to be careful about unmuting before it's time to speak. And in the meantime, Your Honor, I'm trying to -- I'm frantically trying to find somebody from IT to see if we can help things on this end.

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THE COURT: And Ms. Smith, I'll be patient to give you time to unmute, so go ahead.

MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. Thank you. And I apologize. We have been trying to stay mute when I'm not speaking.

But in the Webex chat, to be clear, I may have misspoke, the Webex chat, three pages that were produced do relate to Ms. Pajak's laptop.

But Your Honor, the issue of Ms. Pajak having information on her laptop is separate and apart from the issue of whether Under Armour spoliated evidence in this case, and Judge Keeley very clearly addressed that issue during the hearing on March 4th. And Judge Keeley -- when Mr. Harrison raised that issue that Ms. Pajak has information, Judge Keeley said that doesn't give Under Armour a pass if they had notice, and they've had notice since June of 2018 that Ms. Pajak has an attorney and was likely to sue them, and they did not preserve the evidence. That's spoliation on Under Armour's part regardless of the fact that Ms. Pajak had her laptop.

Ms. Pajak dutifully gave her laptop back to Under Armour when they instructed her to do so in December of 2018, and despite litigation holds, that laptop, Ms. Hurney just told the Court again, was not placed in a litigation hold room. It was not preserved. That's been represented to the Court on multiple occasions.

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THE COURT: Ms. Smith, I'm simply raising my hand so -- I would interject, but whenever we're together, we get this echo, so if you can mute yourself now.

What I'm going to do on this -- y'all are going to have a forensic examination on Friday of her laptop. You know what was on there, what you preserved. I'm simply going to hold a ruling on this motion in abeyance until your forensic examination is done, and your forensic examination may show nothing was deleted and everything is on there that Ms. Pajak knows was on there. It may very well show that things were deleted that were favorable to her case that she preserved.

But I just think it's a bit premature, until you see what the forensic examination of her laptop reveals, and then you have your expert to do so. I assume if there were things that were favorable to you, you have them and your forensic expert will be able to tell you whether or not there was any efforts -- focused and particularized efforts by Under Armour to remove those things. So I think it's premature at this time. I will hold it in abeyance.

What I will do, Ms. Smith, if you can -- your forensic expert gives you additional evidence in a report that things that were, for lack of a better word, favorable to Ms. Pajak and her discharge case were intentionally deleted by UA, then I'll look at that report and I may not need to do anything else, because that report may take care of what you

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need. But I think I need to see what your forensic expert has to say in that regard.

Now, as to -- go ahead and go on about the Webex

Teams chat log as to efforts to locate Pajak's laptop. I want
you to go ahead and finish up on that. I know you got some
information, and I want to hear what you have to say about
that, Ms. Hurney, so go ahead, Ms. Smith, if you have anything
else about the efforts to locate Pajak's laptop.

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, one point of clarification.

When you refer to what you term the forensic inspection on July
23rd, that's really nothing more than a physical view of the
laptop that's scheduled for -- and being scheduled for July
23rd. It's not a forensic examination of the laptop. I
believe that there's been a clone made of Ms. Pajak's laptop
and provided to our expert previously, pursuant to the Court's
order, and what's to happen on the 23rd is just a visual
inspection.

THE COURT: Well, I appreciate and I do recall the reminder about the clone, but the substance is the same. If he does a forensic examination of the clone and he has any evidence that suggests that something's been intentionally removed from there that you all can show to the Court is relevant or favorable to her case, in your opinion, based upon what you have, then I think you've already made your case in regard to that particular situation. But I will permit you to

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explore that once you have your forensic report. Do you have the forensic report on the clone, Ms. Smith?

MS. SMITH: Sorry. Took a minute to unmute there.

We do not have the forensic report completed on the clone, Your

Honor, at this point.

THE COURT: So when you do, then I think this all becomes far less speculative and you may have your questions answered either in a way that's favorable to you or in a way that's not favorable or that's neutral. But I just think that it's better to see what your forensic reveals in that regard and I can answer that.

Now, tell me about Webex. So some things were provided to you. Why do you think what was provided is inadequate?

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, the request was for all responsive documents from Webex Teams to the discovery request. What happened during Mr. Kitchen's deposition is we heard of a whole different method of communicating that was not searched throughout any of this responsive -- this discovery. And that's jarring, Your Honor. It's a parallel universe that Under Armour is operating under where they are encouraging their employees to communicate not by email, but by Teams -- Webex Teams, and before that Cisco Jabber, and they're not searching, apparently, because we have none of this information until they provided the three pages.

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THE COURT: Let me ask you this, Ms. Smith: If your children want to get ahold of you quickly, do they text you or do they send you an email?

MS. SMITH: It depends on the context, but if I had a document request for communications with my children, I'd search both.

THE COURT: Okay. Mine don't look at emails. They look at texts. And I think we're in a time where people just -- it's almost, rather than picking up the phone, they just communicate by -- we have Webex at the court system, and it's our instant messaging. It's how I communicate with my law clerks. It's how they communicate with me quickly. And they know that's a quicker way to get hold of me and talk than sending an email.

So I don't -- I say it as a bit of a common practice, but -- and it's a different kind of communication, because it's a quick just kind of conversational communication, as I understand it.

So Ms. Hurney, tell me, what have you all provided in that regard, and is there anything else that would -- I wasn't aware that it could be reproduced, quite honestly, but what have you provided and is that everything that you have?

MS. HURNEY: Your Honor, the document that Ms. Smith had been referencing, I don't have the Bates numbers on hand, but the conversation that Mr. Kitchen testified to in his

deposition, the conversation between himself and Mr. Maryanski, we have produced that conversation that was referenced in the deposition, Your Honor. That is a nonprivileged communication and that is, in fact, responsive to prior discovery requests sent by plaintiff. As a result, we have produced it.

If I could make a few points, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

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MS. HURNEY: Your Honor, Ms. Smith made this point: Webex Teams, as Mr. Kitchen testified in his deposition, came into being it sounds like in 2020, so after the litigation had commenced. So Webex Teams chats wouldn't exist prior to 2020, just because the company wasn't using it at that point, Your Honor.

And to the reference to, I believe, Cisco Jabber, we recently had the opportunity to depose Ms. Pajak, and when asked the sorts of programs that she used in her job, she didn't list any sort of additional communication programs or software, which leads to my third point.

Mr. Kitchen had testified in his deposition that he sees corporate employees use Webex Teams as a means for communication. There is a distinction to be had between corporate employees and retail employees, Your Honor. At UA that means something. Retail folks are out in the field. They work in the store. They're boots on the ground. Corporate are those that are in the corporate location, Your Honor. That is

my understanding.

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I do believe there's a distinction to be made between Mr. Kitchen's testimony about corporate employees commonly using this sort of messenger feature. It's probably convenient for them when they're not on the road.

THE COURT: What did you provide to Ms. Smith?

MS. HURNEY: Your Honor, there is a series of messages between Steven Kitchen and Mike Maryanski, who he reports to on the Under Armour side, Your Honor, and that was regarding the Pajak laptop, and I believe the communications took place in May of 2021. That is what he testified to in his deposition.

THE COURT: Okay. And that's where the efforts were trying to locate Pajak's computer, right?

MS. HURNEY: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So back to you, Ms. Smith. I mean, I think that's what you wanted, which is what's going on between Maryanski and Kitchen as to trying to locate this laptop, so what's insufficient?

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, I believe Ms. Hurney just told you in a roundabout way that Under Armour has done nothing whatsoever to review either Webex Teams chats or Cisco Jabber for responsive information regarding Ms. Pajak's discovery request, despite the fact that many of the people who are involved here are, in fact, corporate, Mr. Toner, Mr. Boucher.

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Many of the people involved in this litigation and who have the responsibility to provide responsive documents are, in fact, corporate. And regardless, there has been no effort whatsoever to search these relevant chains of communication and to provide responsive information.

The fact that they so readily had these three pages and this looks like it just -- it begins on May 4th at 11:01 a.m., and it ends, three pages of it, on May 5th. It's one day's worth that was provided to us between Mr. Kitchen and Mr. Maryanski. Clearly they're using the Webex Teams chat, and this needs to -- we were taken aback when we found that there are whole other means of communications that were not searched at all with the discovery responses here.

It's another indication it took them very little time. Mr. Kitchen volunteered that responsive information was on these -- on this method of communication that we don't use, we didn't know anything about. But communications broadly certainly were requested in the discovery request, and certainly the Rules of Civil Procedure require that those means of discovery are communications that must be searched.

THE COURT: It's an interesting -- I understand your argument. I'm not convinced I accept it, but I have to think about it. I can tell you, I mean, for example, when I want to communicate with my law clerk, I don't pick up my phone. I don't dial his extension and wait for it to ring and he answers

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it. It's a quick, I need this, and he responds, and it's the quickest way of communication.

And so it's certainly not the formality of an email or other things, and so I don't -- I'm not reading into it what you are. And plus, it's a relatively new means of communication that they've been using, and sort of text. And I don't want to call it text, but it's just sort of very internal communication.

But I think -- let me understand from Ms. Hurney, I mean, as far as you know, are there any other communications between Maryanski and Kitchen about trying to locate Pajak's -- or is this what happened in trying to locate Pajak's laptop, what you've shared with them and what you've provided?

MS. HURNEY: This is all we're aware of between Mr. Kitchen, Mr. Maryanski regarding the location and the efforts to locate the Pajak laptop, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I don't know what else to say,

Ms. Smith, other than they have now given to you what are the

communications.

MS. SMITH: May I, Your Honor? The first communication is, I have Pajak's laptop. So that's the beginning of it. Not efforts to locate it. That's the beginning. That's the first one, 5-4-2021, at 11:01. I have Pajak's laptop.

THE COURT: And that's what Kitchen is saying, or

Maryanski?

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MS. SMITH: I'm sorry, Your Honor. That was

Mr. Kitchen to Mr. Maryanski, it appears. So we need to know
what came before that. That's clearly not the beginning.

THE COURT: Hold it there.

Now, Ms. Hurney, what about that? I mean, do you have anything before the 5-4-2021 communication? It does sound odd we would just start out, I have it. Was a request made to look for it, and when?

MS. HURNEY: Your Honor, those are the only chats we're aware of that discuss the Pajak laptop. What I would assume, Your Honor, is that there were communications by email that have either already been produced in this case because they are nonprivileged and, in fact, responsive to the prior request by plaintiff, or they are privileged communications that are including UA's in-house legal counsel or external counsel regarding the laptop, but we have produced this part of the chat -- this is the only chat we're aware of that has to do with Ms. Pajak's laptop.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand the argument. And I understand yours, Ms. Smith. I have looked at the emails in camera that had to do with legal assistants and people in the legal department attempting to locate these laptops, and the only thing in there, as I've represented before in writing in my order, was simply mere logistical attempts to locate the

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laptops, nothing else, just back and forth about trying to locate them and that's it, nothing to suggest any argument that would support hiding anything or any spoliation claims, at least what was produced to me in camera, which I understand was the emails, and I've ruled on that.

So let's -- in addition, you've had the opportunity to depose Kitchen at length. I sat in on most of it. And after hearing that, there are a number of things. Kitchen is just kind of the keeper of these things. He gets involved. They finally find her laptop and -- at a late date, and you all now have it and you've had the opportunity to look at it, but I just -- I haven't seen anything that would suggest, other than people trying to find these things, and I get the argument that why didn't it happen quickly, where was it. And I understand that. But I don't know what else to say with it.

I understand your argument that you want them to produce what Webex text Teams chats they have. I'll take that under advisement.

Let me ask Ms. Hurney one question. In terms of just proportionality and reasonableness, are these things easily -- I know it's a relative term. Are they easily produced and stored, or what's your understanding?

MS. HURNEY: I'm not sure, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Who would know that?

MS. HURNEY: Mr. Maryanski would know, Your Honor.

We can inquire.

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THE COURT: He's the tech guy; is that correct,

Ms. Hurney? Is Mr. Maryanski a tech guy who's Mr. Kitchen's supervisor?

MS. HURNEY: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I think I've heard what I needed to on that issue, and I'll make my ruling.

Let's go on to number four, Ms. Smith, list of all devices, IDed by serial number or similar identifier, used by Boucher. So why don't you go ahead and tell me your argument in that regard.

MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. This issue came up in the testimony of Mr. Kitchen when he indicated -- actually, it came up in the context of learning for the first time during this deposition of Mr. Kitchen that, in fact, Mr. Boucher had a whole other laptop for most of the relevant time period here. That was, again, quite shocking.

But Mr. Kitchen testified that Mr. Boucher had a laptop through the -- I believe it was November of 2018 that was stolen from an airport in Bogota, Colombia. Despite all of the hearings on these issues beginning back in January of 2020 regarding Ms. Pajak's motion to inspect Mr. Boucher's devices, it's never been explained to the Court that Mr. Boucher had a laptop for most of the relevant time period and it was stolen, a few weeks before Ms. Pajak was terminated, from an airport in

Bogota, Colombia.

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And so in the context of telling Mr. Rector how

Mr. Kitchen locates devices or can tell what devices have been
issued to someone, Mr. Kitchen testified that there is
something called Absolute, and that Absolute could find all of
someone's devices. He testified on page 170 to 172 with regard
to the context and how he found Mr. Boucher's devices, what had
been issued to Mr. Boucher on Absolute, and he testified on
pages 223 to 225 as to exactly what Absolute is and the fact
that Absolute can -- you can run reports off of Absolute which
give you lists of laptops issued to people, including Brian
Boucher, but not limited to him. You can just plug that in and
can do it by serial number. It can do it by Under Armour issue
number. It was the first thing that Mr. Boucher looked for to
find Ms. Cynthia Pajak's laptop in February of 2021.

THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Smith, let me interrupt you now, because I want to speak to Ms. Hurney.

I mean, Ms. Hurney, can Under Armour produce simply an inventory of maybe six items that was issued to -- electronic items that was issued to Mr. Boucher during his employment? I mean, is it as simple as running it off of this program, Absolute, print it off, and said when he started, he had a laptop, an iPad, a phone, he lost an iPad, got another one. I mean, seems to me that should be able to be done as to what devices he had that were issued and then what he returned.

1 Can Under Armour do that? 2 MS. HURNEY: Your Honor, the program that's being 3 referenced, the software that plaintiff has brought up called 4 Absolute, that's a software program installed only on laptops, 5 PCs, and Macs. Other devices used by Mr. Boucher wouldn't be 6 picked up by Absolute, so as a result, we couldn't use that for 7 all devices that Mr. Boucher had. 8 THE COURT: Are you able to, in a -- just simply an 9 interrogatory response or say on the record what devices were 10 issued to him, or is Under Armour unable to say what devices 11 were issued to their employees? 12 MS. HURNEY: We could respond to an interrogatory 13 regarding Mr. Boucher's devices, Your Honor, yes. 14 THE COURT: Well, I don't know -- I'm trying to 15 see -- yes, I'm directing you then to respond to the 16 interrogatory, which is what devices were listed to him, and 17 identify them with as much particularity as you can. 18 So does that answer that question, Ms. Smith? MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor, if they provide that 19 20 information. 21 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 22 Now, what about this chain-of-custody form? Has that 23 been taken care of? 24 MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, I apologize. I don't mean 25 to interject and prolong this, but in terms of responding to

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     that interrogatory, can we get a time period, please?
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               THE COURT: How much time would you need?
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               MR. HARRISON: I just mean the scope of --
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    Mr. Boucher was employed by Under Armour for several years.
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    How far back --
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               THE COURT: You mean not the time within which to
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    provide it. I just think we talk about the -- what devices he
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    had at the -- let me ask you, Ms. -- when did Mr. Boucher --
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     when was he first employed? Ms. Hurney, when was he first
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     employed with Under Armour?
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               MS. HURNEY: Your Honor, Mr. Kaminski could probably
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     correct me. I want to say it was around 2015, Your Honor, I
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    believe.
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               THE COURT: And so Ms. -- what do you consider the
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     relevant time period, Ms. Smith? I know when the lawsuit was
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     filed. I think we should have a reasonable time period before
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     it, but what time period are you suggesting or requesting,
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    Ms. Smith?
               MS. SMITH: 2017, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Let's just make it January 1,
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     2017, to his discharge.
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               MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, if I might, all the
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     allegations in the amended complaint refer to actions and
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     activities that took place in 2018.
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               THE COURT: Ms. Smith, why wouldn't January 1, 2018,
               Cindy L. Knecht, RMR/CRR/CBC/CCP
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    be the appropriate date?
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               MS. SMITH: Your Honor, because he could have a
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     laptop that was issued in 2017 and 2018, or a phone or an iPad.
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               THE COURT: They are going to indicate, January 1,
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     2018, what laptop he had. Could have been issued to him in
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     2015. But I want to know the devices he had as of January 1,
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     2018. Is that helpful, Mr. Harrison?
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               MR. HARRISON: (Indicates thumbs up.)
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               THE COURT: How much time will you need to respond to
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     that, do you think, Ms. Hurney?
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              MS. HURNEY: A week would be sufficient, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay. I'll direct you to do so within a
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     week.
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               So let's go on to the chain of custody. Did you have
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     anything else to say about that, Ms. Smith?
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              MS. SMITH: No, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT:
                          I'm sorry. Has that been provided?
              MS. SMITH: Yes, it has.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Good. So that's number five.
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               Number six, I have a lease return spreadsheet. I
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     understand that that has been produced; is that correct,
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    Ms. Smith?
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               MS. SMITH: Your Honor, they produced several pages
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     that they purport to include a lease return list. I suppose
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     that's adequate. I'm not sure what it is yet. It's just a
               Cindy L. Knecht, RMR/CRR/CBC/CCP
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list of numbers.

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THE COURT: Well, that may be what a lease return spreadsheet looks like, but I'll give you an opportunity, if you think that's insufficient, to make an additional request, but at this time Under Armour has represented it has been produced, it's what they have, and so upon your review, if there's something you believe otherwise, then that will be my holding.

Now, number seven, there's documents, emails, communications showing why Pajak's laptop was in the lease return bin instead of on a legal hold. I don't want you to say anything about that. I first want to hear from Under Armour. I was listening to Mr. Kitchen's deposition in particular in that regard when they found it in a lease return bin.

Ms. Hurney, are there any documents, communications, emails, as to how it ended up in the bin?

MS. HURNEY: Your Honor, we have not located any responsive documents or communications that are nonprivileged that would answer that question.

THE COURT: And what -- I mean, are there communications between lawyers or paralegals explaining how it ended up in the lease bin?

MS. HURNEY: There is communications with counsel, Your Honor, on the subject.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I want you to produce those

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     to the Court in camera, please.
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               MS. HURNEY: Yes, Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to review those,
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    Ms. Smith, and then I'll issue an order in that regard and go
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     from there.
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               The in camera deadlines that I've talked about,
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    Ms. Hurney, is a week going to be enough for you?
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               MS. HURNEY: Yes, Your Honor, that would be
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     sufficient. Thank you.
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               THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. So that will be the
     28th.
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               Now, number eight, the updated privilege log,
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    Ms. Smith, showing when emails were sent to Kitchen regarding
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     locating Pajak's and Boucher's devices, indicates to me that UA
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     has supplemented this and it's no longer in dispute. Again,
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     that's what my summary indicates. Is that correct or is that
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     not correct, or is there something more to it, Ms. Smith?
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               MS. SMITH: Your Honor, we would request that any of
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     the documents that have been discussed today be added to that
    privilege log as well. As far as we know, it's been
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     supplemented, but it's a continuing effort and it's important
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     that we have access to the privilege log.
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               THE COURT: My understanding is, Ms. Hurney, you have
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    provided the updated privilege log; is that correct?
25
               MS. HURNEY: Yes, Your Honor. The communications
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between Steven Kitchen and counsel, and whether in-house or
external, have been placed on the privilege log, yes.
          THE COURT: And Ms. Smith already has those?
          MS. HURNEY: (Nods head.)
          THE COURT: Is that correct?
         MS. HURNEY: I believe so, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Okay. So were you identifying something
else, Ms. Smith? I mean, it's represented that you have that.
                      Specifically, Your Honor, I was referring
          MS. SMITH:
to the documents that you were just discussing Ms. Hurney to
provide to the Court in camera. I don't believe -- to my
knowledge, those have not been placed on a privilege log, so
what I was referring to was the documents specifically we're
referring to today or any continued supplementation.
          THE COURT: I know that we talked about Pajak's
laptop and why it was in the lease return bin instead of being
on legal hold, that perhaps some communications that you're
asserting, Ms. Hurney, are attorney-client privilege. To that
extent, I want to see those documents as well as a privilege
log supporting it. Does that make sense?
          MS. HURNEY: Yes, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Okay. Is that what you were getting at,
Ms. Smith?
          MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor.
                      Okay. So I see there's a number nine on
          THE COURT:
          Cindy L. Knecht, RMR/CRR/CBC/CCP
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my list, which says all emails or other communications from UA's legal team to Kitchen instructing him to locate Pajak's and Boucher's devices. So tell me why you believe that that's not attorney-client and I should order that be produced, Ms. Smith.

MS. SMITH: Absolutely, Your Honor. Mr. Kitchen testified that his relationship with Ms. Finck was such that she was not giving him legal advice or instructing him legally; that all of the communications that they had were simply, as Your Honor said during the deposition and here today as well, logistical. And those logistical communications are critical to Ms. Pajak's time line and her understanding of what happened with regard to the efforts to preserve evidence and the spoliation of evidence, quite frankly.

But Mr. Kitchen testified during his deposition that his relationship with Ms. Finck was not a legal one, that there was no legal advice given, that it was simply logistical. And Your Honor recognized that during the hearing and made some rulings during the hearing that if the -- during the deposition, that if the objections of Under Armour and Mr. Walls are taken to the extreme, Ms. Pajak would be entitled to nothing, and in fact, that's the nature of the objections. There are objections at every turn to everything we asked for and we believe that we're entitled to the documents that show what the directions were. I think that that's consistent

with --

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THE COURT: Here's what I'm going to rule on that.

Ms. Hurney, to the extent that there are any documents as -- or emails between Mr. Kitchen and -- my recollection, I can't think of the paralegal who he said he met with who said -- who was basically giving him some directions as to what to look for. He did it and she wrote it down and then he signed the declaration.

So Ms. Hurney, if there's any other communications to Kitchen that would advise him as to what he was to do in looking for things on that device, I would direct you to submit those to me in camera, and then I can determine whether they're logistical, attorney-client.

And my understanding is that's pretty minimal; is that correct, Ms. Hurney?

MS. HURNEY: I believe so. And I think the Court may have already examined some of these emails when Mr. Walls provided emails to the Court in camera.

THE COURT: And I may have. I mean, I -- I recall looking at this type of emails, which were short, cryptic, and really logistical about just finding things. But if that's --

Ms. Hurney, if they've already been produced, would you simply produce them again in camera to just say, Judge, these are the communications, and then I can take a look at those and discern whether there's any violation of

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attorney-client privilege or whether it's outside of the scope
of that. And then -- can you do that all within a week,
Ms. Hurney, on that list?
         MS. HURNEY: Of course, Your Honor. Thank you.
          THE COURT: Okay. Now, I think in regard to ECF
Number 466, Ms. Smith, that I've addressed everything; is that
correct? And if not, please let me know.
         MS. SMITH: Your Honor, I believe that's it, Your
Honor.
          THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
          So certainly, Ms. Hurney, if you can get those things
sooner, that's wonderful. I know you all have a hearing before
Judge Keeley on August 10th, and I certainly want to have my
rulings done in a time so that you have the benefit of those
and to express your disagreement with those before Judge
Keeley. Certainly she'll have the final say on it.
         Okay. I now want to -- Mr. Fetty, as far as you're
concerned, are we okay on ECF 466?
         NATHAN FETTY: Yes, sir, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
         Now, let's go to ECF 430. Looks like, Mr. Harrison,
you're stepping up, so you're going to handle that one?
         MR. HARRISON: Yes, Your Honor, if you don't mind.
          THE COURT: Now, this has to do with the 30(b)(6)
depo, and I see that United -- I'm sorry, Under Armour has
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objected to certain topics identified, so with that, let's talk about topic nine, Mr. Harrison. I'm going to try to give the outline of what I think is appropriate under the 30(b)(6), and I'll certainly give you the opportunity, Ms. Smith, to help me consider whether I missed anything from your perspective.

So I understand, Mr. Harrison, that you consider it too broad and also see where you've talked about there are some things that you anticipate that your representative could talk about, so do you want to explain that to me?

MR. HARRISON: Yes, Your Honor. And so what we're coming up against in this case and the recent discovery disputes is what type of evidence does plaintiff believe has been spoliated in this case. In her amended complaint, she identifies three categories of information that form the basis of her spoliation theory.

And the Court may already be familiar with this, but the three categories are My Game Plan, HR Analytics, and text messages from Brian Boucher. Now, Under Armour certainly can produce a witness to explain the existence or nonexistence of information regarding My Game Plan, the existence or nonexistence of information related to HR Analytics. No objection to doing that. It's identified in the complaint. We understand that's at issue.

As for why Mr. Boucher's texts are no longer available, I don't think it makes sense to have Under Armour

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produce a designee to testify about that. Mr. Boucher is the one who testified he may have deleted the text messages towards the end of his employment. If plaintiff wants to find out why those text messages are no longer available, I think the inquiry should go to Mr. Boucher, not to Under Armour through a 30(b)(6) witness.

And so those are the three categories that I wanted to address. The problem I have with the original topic as described by plaintiff, it's overly broad. And, I mean, let me put it in context for you. We have tried very hard to have plaintiff identify for us in discovery what evidence she believes is missing. We had a phone call with opposing counsel this morning pursuant to the Court's order, and we're at loggerheads a little bit as to plaintiff's obligation to disclose what evidence she believes is missing so that we can wrap up discovery on this case. And this topic goes to that.

The only evidence identified in the complaint are these three categories. We're prepared to go forward with a 30(b)(6) on two of the three. We don't think Under Armour should have to produce a witness to explain why Mr. Boucher may have deleted text messages near the end of his employment.

THE COURT: Sure. So, I mean, Ms. Smith, I want to hear what you have to say, but I really don't know -- how do you respond to a question that says all evidence about what evidence no longer exists. I don't know how you answer that.

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So I certainly am going to permit you to question their representative about My Game Plan, about HR Analytics. It does appear that all the allegations have to do with Boucher, who's a defendant in this, and to that extent, at least, I understand you've had a pretty exhaustive deposition of Boucher, but he's a named party. It seems that that is the best way to handle that.

So tell me if you have anything with particularity other than My Game Plan and the HR -- I mean, that this witness -- this witness can come prepared to answer. I mean, to say all evidence, I think, Ms. Smith, is just too broad. So go ahead.

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, thank you.

First, I want to be very clear, because this issue of -- which is just a red herring, has come up time and time again in these discovery disputes, and it just has to be dispelled.

In the motion for leave to amend the complaint,

Ms. Pajak did not in any way, shape, form, or fashion, as

Governor Justice famously says, limit herself to the three

topics that Mr. Harrison just identified. And at the hearing

on March 4th, Ms. Williams made it clear that Ms. Pajak's

claims of spoliation go beyond those three categories that

Mr. Harrison has continually tried to pigeonhole her into.

THE COURT: Slow down, Ms. Smith. We really got to

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back off the editorialization, counsel. The reason for this, Ms. Smith, is that I don't want to have a witness there who's going to say -- you're going to say all evidence and he's going to say, this is only what I can speak to. And I don't know how you get a Rule 30(b)(6) witness without some specificity to be able for them to produce to answer your questions. So that's the practical matter I have.

And so if you can identify some things with particularity rather than saying all, then that will be helpful to the Court. And that will give us some direction as to who I will tell them to produce and how to answer those questions. I mean, does that make sense, Ms. Smith?

MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. We'll be happy to provide a list.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, can you do it now and let's talk about it, because I haven't found much agreement between the parties.

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, there are a number of items that have been spoliated.

THE COURT: Here's what I'm going to do on that,

Ms. Smith. I want you to email that list to the Court. Can

you get that to me before the end of business tomorrow? I want

you to copy Mr. Harrison. Then I'll give you an opportunity -
and send a list to Mr. Fetty. Copy Mr. Harrison. And I want

as much specificity as you can.

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And then in that regard, Mr. Harrison, I understand
you're arguing about the three things listed. If there are
other things that are specific, I will want you to indicate to
the Court your objection, and then I'm just going to say in
that regard what your witness has to be able to testify to, to
the best of their knowledge. And if there is no evidence, then
your person can say that.
          So are you able to do that by the end of the day
tomorrow, Ms. Smith?
          MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Okay. And then I'll give you till the
end of the following Monday. Would that work for you,
Mr. Harrison?
          MR. HARRISON: (Indicates thumbs up.)
          THE COURT: Which would be July 26th, the end of
business, to respond.
          MR. HARRISON: Yes, Your Honor.
          THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.
          Now, I'm just going to go right to topic ten. I
mean, what -- I mean, it seems -- topic ten, it seems to me,
Ms. Smith, that -- what does Sarbanes-Oxley have to do with
this? And so if you're talking about recordkeeping, what is it
in particular that you're talking about? I mean, there's no
fraudulent accounting or reporting or financial things, so what
recordkeeping are you talking about and what kind of questions
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do you want to ask in that regard? So tell me that.

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MS. SMITH: Okay. Your Honor, under Sarbanes-Oxley, publicly traded companies have to certify document controls, and they have to have systems in place for document controls, and Mr. Catzen, the defendant's expert, has testified with regard to that. Well, Under Armour has represented to Judge Keeley that they have no policies with regard to that, these issues, when the issue came up previously in a hearing. And these are relevant lines of inquiry because of the fact that Under Armour's publicly traded and subject to Sarbanes-Oxley.

THE COURT: Mr. Harrison.

MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, just to correct the record here today, Under Armour has record retention policies. What I told the Court on March 4th is that Under Armour did not have a written record of retention policy for HR records.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARRISON: That's true today. That doesn't mean we don't have protocols. That doesn't mean we don't have processes. And if plaintiff wants to inquire about those protocols or processes, or why there's not something in writing in terms of personnel records or HR records, that's fine. I don't understand the Sarbanes-Oxley piece. We're going to need some more specification.

Plaintiff was employed in West Virginia. Are we -if we're going to look at what state requirements for

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preservation of HR records, are we going to look at West

Virginia, or are we going to look at Maryland, where Under

Armour is based? Are we talking about OSHA records? Are we talking about payroll records?

I give you some context for this. I've been asked repeatedly during my practice to provide record retention schedules for employers. There are different time frames that we recommend and suggest, depending upon the type of information. And that basically goes to how long employers and maybe other types of entities have to keep certain types of records. These things are going to vary.

And this may be apples and oranges, but just to give you an example in health care. In health care, employment records might be maintained for two years. Payroll records might be maintained for five years. The medical records are going to be maintained maybe 18 or 20. And OSHA has a different set of requirements.

So I think we're entitled to a little bit more specification here from plaintiff, what type of state and federal requirements is she referring to. Can she identify them specifically so that we can properly prepare a witness.

But I will tell you this, and this issue isn't really before the Court. We've given a preview of it. We deposed plaintiff on June 22nd, and she was unable to identify any information that was supposedly missing from My Game Plan,

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which is the human resources information system. She was unable to identify any information from that system that should have been produced that hasn't been produced in this case.

And, in fact, she contradicted one of the key allegations in her complaint, which is that Under Armour failed to produce midyear performance evaluations for 2017 to 2018. She testified that the process had changed and those were no longer reduced to writing. And so this feels like an academic exercise in the abstract. I just want to put that out there.

But if plaintiff can provide us with specification on what she needs by whatever state or federal or regulatory requirement she's referring to, we can tee off that.

THE COURT: So certainly I think it is, and I don't think that Under Armour disputes that you can talk to them about certainly they have someone there as to how they maintain or what their protocols are and policy is in regard to human resource records.

Are you looking at something broader than that, Ms. Smith? And if so, in particular what, and then tell me why.

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, we're looking for obviously the records retention policies with regard to -- and their compliance in particular. This is their compliance with state and regulatory obligations. They know what state and regulatory obligations --

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THE COURT: Well, you shouldn't assume that. I mean, god, there are lots of states and federal regulations. So, I mean, you have to have someone there who can ask those. And, I mean, it's a broad question just to tell me how do you comply with all state and federal regulations. That's -- there's just so many things.

So, I mean, this is an employment discrimination case. I think the focus needs to be on what's relevant in an employment discrimination case. And in particular that the allegation is that she was discriminated against because, I believe, her sex and age. So I just -- why would anything outside of that be relevant?

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, to clarify, this is a retaliation claim --

THE COURT: Well, okay.

MS. SMITH: -- by Ms. Pajak, but in answer to your question, while human resources is certainly relevant here and we would expect that type of information, it's been testified to that -- or represented by Mr. Harrison that Under Armour has no retention policy for anything other than emails. He represented that to Judge Keeley very broadly.

And with regard to the nature of this case, their retention policy with regard to all of these devices that we've been talking about is also critical. The litigation hold, the legal hold room, and all of the devices that we've been

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discussing, laptops, iPads, phones, and their retention of those and the information on them.

THE COURT: And I agree with that. And I think
that -- Mr. Harrison, I think we talked about it earlier. I
expect you all to have someone who can testify as to their
policy and procedures as to what do you do when you get a legal
hold. What are your policies and protocols. Are they written.
No. Then what are they and how do people understand them and
then they can list them. I think that's extremely relevant and
I'd certainly permit them to ask that, Mr. Harrison.

In regard to the keeping of employment files as it has to do with someone's employment, I mean, not their medical records or benefits or anything like that, I mean, this is an employment claim, a retaliation claim, and but I understand it to be a retaliation claim based upon how she felt they were treating women; is that correct, Ms. Smith?

MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So I can just tell you that if you're going to ask a question about all state and federal law and what your policy on records retention, I'm going to overrule it, just saying that it's too broad. If you're going to ask about what your HR -- well, what are your HR policies and protocols in regard to when you get put on notice of a potential litigation, they will answer that. What do you do then with those devices. Where are they placed. How's that

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kept track of. How are those -- how are those items preserved.

That's certainly appropriate. So you know what their policy and protocol is.

And if the person answers, there's no written, this is our policy and protocol, then that's their policy and protocol. Whether that's a good idea or not, that's for someone else to decide.

I just -- I don't see getting outside of that,

Ms. Smith, as being relevant, but maybe there's something else
that is particularly relevant that I'm missing. I mean, does
that sound fair in your line of questioning of them, and

Mr. Harrison will have someone who's able to answer that?

MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. And again, Mr. Harrison, in particular because it is -- the additional discovery is spoliation, it has to do with her employment, the records of her employment, her performance, those things that have to do with the meat of a retaliation claim based upon her being a female, in essence, a sex discrimination claim also, and an employment claim.

And then in particular because it seems to me in following this, how are certain things preserved, policy and procedures, and you'll have that person there who will be able to produce, if there is written, you'll produce it; if there's not, what their policy and protocols are.

Is that helpful, Mr. Harrison?

MR. HARRISON: Absolutely.

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THE COURT: Okay. Let's go -- again, on topic eleven, this whole what's their obligations and requirements for record retention as a publicly traded company, my goodness, if this was a shareholders' litigation suit, I might think that's relevant, but did I cover earlier, I think, the areas that you think you need to get into, Ms. Smith?

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, if they do have obligations as a publicly traded company, we have a right to ask about that. If they don't do anything to comply with those, then they can answer that question. But we should be able to ask -- and the same thing back -- this relates back to Sarbanes-Oxley. They have requirements under Sarbanes-Oxley. If they don't want to testify to it, we have the right to ask them, I believe, how do you comply with the statute.

THE COURT: This is where you're not answering my question. How is Sarbanes-Oxley, how is record retention as a publicly traded company, how is that relevant to your particular case and the allegations in your case? They can tell you what their policy and protocols are and what's in writing. If you later determine that it's not in compliance with Sarbanes-Oxley or publicly traded company and you think that's relevant at trial and the trial court permits it in, then that's their business, but this is an employment case and

it's a retaliation case, and so it's not bigger than that.

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And so, I just -- I mean, I'm asking for help,

Ms. Smith, but if you all keep making it broader, then you've

made it real easy for me. I'm going to keep it narrow, because

I just see no reason Sarbanes-Oxley and publicly traded

company, again, if you want to make an argument to the Court

that, you know what, Your Honor, the fact that they don't have

a written policy in regard to retaining certain records is in

violation of federal and state law in regard to publicly traded

companies, you can make that argument. But this is about

facts, your client, and information that they have in regard to

her, and it's an employment retaliation case and that's the

focus of it.

I just can't see getting outside of that. And so if you all start to do so, just -- I don't know how much more I can say as to what I think is relevant context and to your questioning.

So let's go on to number 12. Plaintiff seeks testimony, all actions taken by Steven Kitchen in making his sworn statement. I think, Ms. -- I know -- I don't know about the timeliness. I know you've taken his deposition. Seemed to be a thorough deposition. I don't know what anyone has to add other than what he said in regard to his communications with lawyers and others. I've taken that under advisement. I'm going to review those documents, but is there anything else

about that topic 12 and Kitchen that you wanted to identify, Ms. Smith?

MS. SMITH: That's sufficient, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

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It seems to me I've already ruled on topic 13 and the declaration of Olson on these -- when I ruled about the subpoena issues. Do you think I've -- did I resolve that? I'm not saying in a way that anyone agrees with, but did I resolve it? Do you believe so, Mr. Harrison?

MR. HARRISON: Your Honor, not exactly. So what you did resolve were the subpoenas that were served upon JND, Olson, and Ben Sexton, and those were document production subpoenas. The order that you issued actually has a carve-out as to to what extent there may be a dispute about Olson's deposition. Plaintiff has requested Olson's deposition. If plaintiff wants to depose Olson about the facts that support her declaration, we have no objection to that, and we've been consistent about that, I believe.

I've recently inquired of plaintiff's counsel what other topics they want to ask her about, because that may butt up against some of the rulings you've made, so I would like to -- which hasn't been provided yet, but assuming Olson's deposition goes forward and plaintiff inquires of her regarding what efforts she made, her efforts described in the declaration, I don't know why Under Armour has to provide a

30(b)(6) testimony to duplicate that.

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THE COURT: Okay. So tell me, Ms. Smith, your position on that. I think I did discuss that if -- that you would have the opportunity to depose Olson, if you so desired, again, about the logistics and the process as to how she came about providing the declaration that she made. So what is it you would want of a 30(b)(6) that would not be duplicative?

MS. SMITH: Well, to begin with, Your Honor, a 30(b)(6) deposition is different because it's testimony -- it's broader in its testimony that binds the company. Questioning a particular witness who was involved in something on an individual level is different, frankly.

THE COURT: So what are you going to want to ask this 30(b)(6) about Olson?

MS. SMITH: Well, Your Honor, I believe that asking about the context of the declaration, how it came to be that Ms. Olson was asked to prepare the declaration, and all of the context around it. One of the stumbling blocks that we've run into, Your Honor, in many of these areas with regard to, frankly, the Kitchen deposition — or declaration, the Olson declaration, is this issue of, just go ask Under Armour. Now we're asking Under Armour, and it's, just go ask Ms. Olson.

But we have a right, frankly, Your Honor, to ask both and to get the perspective of the person who did the declaration and the context from the Under Armour

representative who's binding the company.

THE COURT: So Mr. Harrison, you're going to need to have someone, a 30(b)(6), prepared to how was it that Olson came about to be asked to prepare this declaration and what was the expectations in that regard. It's not too big of a question. And they should be able to handle it. That's my ruling on that.

Topic 14, I don't know. Where are you going on topic 14 about something that Mr. Harrison said on the record,
Ms. Smith?

MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. And that goes to the information that's been provided to us all along with regard to Mr. Boucher's devices and during hearings being represented to the Court that Mr. Boucher did not rely on his laptop. I believe that was a reference at the time to the laptop that was spoliated and eventually produced for inspection in, I believe, February, without any regard to the fact that, in fact, he did rely on his laptop. It goes to the Kitchen deposition and declaration.

THE COURT: I understand that, but I think that whole statement was made when we were talking about the laptop, but since then I've permitted you all to inspect the laptop.

You've had your own forensic evaluation about it. I don't know how you ask a 30(b)(6) question to a company representative about what Mr. Harrison represented to the Court. It just --

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just not articulated that way. Mr. Boucher can ask whether he
relied on his laptop. And I'm sure you all thoroughly deposed
Mr. Boucher. But why is that a 30(b)(6) issue? I don't think
it is, so --
         MS. SMITH: Your Honor --
          THE COURT: Go ahead.
          MS. SMITH: I'm sorry. If you asked a question, I'll
answer it. I wasn't unmuted.
          THE COURT: I'm sorry. So you were unable to hear
me?
         MS. SMITH: No. I heard you, Your Honor, ask the
question, I believe, of why that was a Rule 30(b)(6) issue.
          THE COURT: So if you would answer, please.
         MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor. It's a Rule 30(b)(6)
question, Your Honor, because it goes to litigation conduct,
and it goes to the issue of representations during litigation,
and litigation misconduct, frankly, and Under Armour's
involvement in litigation misconduct, making representations to
the Court during the course of litigation that clearly are
false at the time that they're made.
          THE COURT: Okay. So give me an example of what you
would ask a 30(b)(6) witness in regard to what you're saying to
me right now.
          MS. SMITH: Sure, Your Honor. And I would ask if
they were -- first, to start off, if they were aware that
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Mr. Harrison had made that representation to the Court. And I'd ask in follow-up what facts were known to them at the time Mr. Harrison made that representation to the Court. And I'd ask them what they had done to confirm or deny whether Mr. Harrison, in fact, relied on his laptop. THE COURT: Okay. MS. SMITH: I'm sorry. Mr. Boucher relied on his laptop, Your Honor. THE COURT: I've heard enough. You want to say anything about that, Mr. Harrison? MR. HARRISON: No, Your Honor. I think we've talked about this issue enough. THE COURT: Yeah. That's not Rule 30(b)(6), and I'm not going to permit it, and my order will indicate that. Topic 15, plaintiff seeks testimony as to factual basis for counsel Grace Hurney's statement. I'm not going to permit you to talk about topic 15. Again, I don't know why y'all are so tempted to continue to cross this line into what is attorney-client information, and I just -- I don't understand it. Now, in regard to questions about the presentation of the laptop once there is a litigation hold, how that is documented, what their policy and procedure are, you can ask all those things and you will have a corporate rep who will

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answer them. And you are permitted to do that.

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Now, let's go to topic 16, litigation hold as to Pajak laptop, again, of a 30(b)(6). You can talk about the process when there's a litigation hold, so if there is a litigation hold, would it have affected Pajak's laptop. Yes. Would it have affected Boucher's. Yes. And what's your policy and procedure and what happened. And I'm sure, as we all know, that Pajak's laptop wasn't in the litigation hold room. And they can say when it was discovered and what their policy and procedures are in that regard.

But you have it. You're going to have -- you have the -- you're going to be able to do a forensic evaluation on it, and certainly you have the right to ask about the process as to how they handle devices once there's a litigation hold, what's their policies and procedures, and that's very appropriate, and whether they were followed in this case.

That's very appropriate.

And you'll have someone prepared to answer that, correct, Mr. Harrison?

MR. HARRISON: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I will also -- in regard to topic 20, I'm going to permit you to ask the Under Armour representative what, if any, policy they have once someone leaves their employment as to the deletion of items on their personal devices. And they can answer whether they have a policy and procedure or whether, to the best of their

knowledge, Boucher followed that or did not.

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Now, I understand in regard to topic 22,

Mr. Harrison, that you said you will provide a witness who will
answer why Boucher's iPhone was not inspected. As to whether
or not there's a duty to inspect, that's for someone else, but
certainly, Ms. Smith, you can ask the 30(b)(6), did Mr. Boucher
have a phone? Yes. Was it inspected at the time of the
litigation hold or at the time he left his employment. If
their answer is no, you can ask why. If the answer is yes, you
can ask, what are the results of that inspection. I think it's
for the Court, a jury, to conclude what that means, either
failure to inspect the iPhone, and for the Court to conclude
whether or not, if that iPhone was not inspected, has to do
with spoliation. It's a factual question. It's factual
evidence that I think you have a right to find out.

All the legal conclusions, Ms. Smith, are ones you make after you have your facts, but I'm going to let you ask about the phone.

You understand that, Mr. Harrison?

MR. HARRISON: Yes, Your Honor. And I don't have any problem with how you've articulated or characterized the scope of the inquiry. And I hate to be so nit-picky about the words we're using here, but it's -- the way these 30(b)(6) depositions go, if a witness is not prepared to testify about one word that's in the topic, then accusations fly, so that's

why we challenged that topic.

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THE COURT: No. I understand. And that's why I'm doing my best to add clarity.

MR. HARRISON: Thank you.

THE COURT: So tell me about topic 27, Ms. Smith.

The plaintiff seeks testimony of a designee as to UA's failure to retain investigative files. What are you referencing?

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, we're referring to HR files in this case related to the complaints of a witness who has been deposed with initials MD, and who had made complaints, and we understand that the records were destroyed, so we need to know about the investigative files, when the records were destroyed, and who ordered their destruction.

THE COURT: So Mr. -- why don't you tell me your position on that, Mr. Harrison.

MR. HARRISON: Yes, sir. So this requires a little bit more explanation and review. I think Ms. Hurney touched on this back in January of 2021. We were having some other discovery disputes regarding this.

So to review, MD is a store manager for an Under Armour retail location in Clarksburg, Maryland. In January of 2019, she relayed concerns about behavior she saw in the store. Those concerns were eventually relayed to Ms. Pajak. Under Armour does not dispute that MD relayed concerns. MD testified that she could not recall whether she prepared a -- any kind of

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statement or document relative to that incident. And so there's nothing for Under Armour to produce, because we don't believe anything existed in terms of documentation.

And we provided a little bit of explanation to that to plaintiff earlier in this case. One of the HR representatives who was involved with that situation signed a declaration that explained her interactions with Ms. Pajak, so we don't believe -- and we've looked, but we don't believe an investigative file exists for the episode that's identified in the amended complaint that MD testified about.

The problem here is this topic not only addresses that incident; it goes beyond it. So MD testified in her deposition that she experienced problems, was treated inappropriately by other employees, by Under Armour, several years ago, I think 2013, 2014, maybe.

During discovery, plaintiff has attempted to obtain the investigative files related to those incidents. We have been unable to locate or identify those files and, frankly, the people who are involved with that are no longer at Under Armour, so it's been sort of difficult to figure out why those files no longer exist, assuming they did.

But my point is bigger than that. We're going really far back in time and reaching really down -- we're going far away in time and far away in scope in terms of plaintiff's allegations. I don't know why Under Armour -- I don't think

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it's relevant. I don't know why Under Armour has to produce a witness to testify about the absence of investigative files that are completely and wholly unrelated to plaintiff's allegations.

Plaintiff wasn't involved in the incidents that MD testified about in '13 or '14. Boucher was not involved. The people who were involved are no longer at Under Armour. MD testified that she left Under Armour and came back. So it's not impacting MD's employment. It's not something that plaintiff advocated about in 2018. It's not material to the claims in the case. So that's my spiel.

THE COURT: But let me ask this, though. I mean, does Under Armour have policy and protocol as to when a complaint is made, an investigation is held, as to the preservation of those files? And maybe their policy is once they find no cause, they're destroyed. Whether that's a good policy or not, I don't know, but I mean -- and the reason I'm asking that is, you know, there's discovery about spoliation and the issue becomes whether or not there's some --

MR. HARRISON: Nothing was spoliated here. Under Armour isn't going to dispute -- doesn't challenge the fact that MD raised concerns about these incidents.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HARRISON: So I think that kind of bears on this. I don't know ultimately if they're going to be admissible at

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trial, and I know we'll save that -- but Under Armour does not dispute that MD had these concerns in '13, '14, in 2018. We've made that clear to plaintiff for months.

THE COURT: And have they also made it clear that there's no files to share in regard to those disputes, they're gone?

MR. HARRISON: We have, Your Honor. We've looked very hard. I cannot speak to the policies and protocols that were in place and used by HR representatives in '13 and '14. Things have changed since then.

THE COURT: And will your 30(b)(6) be able to say exactly what you represented, we don't know what they were then, today that's not the case, and we can't explain why they no longer exist?

MR. HARRISON: Well, but we can't even explain whether they actually existed, so it's sort of asking us to follow up -- disprove a negative, in a way.

THE COURT: I understand. Did you want to say anything else about that, Ms. Smith? I'm going to think about it, but I want to hear what Ms. Smith has to say.

MS. SMITH: Your Honor, Ms. MD gave -- testified in her deposition that she gave a statement, and Ms. MD left Under Armour's -- Ms. Pajak was aware of Ms. MD and aware that Ms. MD had given a statement regarding improper treatment to HR and from an HR person, the bad behavior. This is evidence of prior

bad acts by Under Armour, even to the HR department.

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Ms. MD made a statement. Ms. MD was employed by

Under Armour until December of 2019, at which point she

testified in part because of the behavior that she received

from Under Armour. And so, Your Honor, it's very relevant here

to Ms. Pajak's claims of spoliation of evidence that the

information with regard to this complaint have not been

produced.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand the argument. And I do get that -- I understand perhaps -- is it your argument number one Mr. Harrison, what does it have to do, any of those arguments, with spoliation in Ms. Pajak's claim, correct?

MR. HARRISON: Correct.

THE COURT: And then I'm understanding your argument,

Ms. Smith, I think what it is that -- I think what you're

wanting to suggest is that when there are these types of

claims, the investigative materials turn up -- they're not

preserved and so they're -- that's -- and that was intentional,

and so that's just evidence of their conduct here; is that

correct?

MS. SMITH: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand the arguments.

Everyone, we kind of stuck these on at the end. I'm done for today. I know we still have ECF 431 and 432 outstanding. What I'm going to do is I don't mind imposing upon you all to stay

around so we can get some dates to reschedule, if I believe we need them. Because a lot of this argument starts to overlap and I think I understand things.

But at this point in time what I'm going to do is go off the record, adjourn, and all I'm going to be discussing with counsel are dates to schedule additional hearings, if necessary, on the two remaining motions referred to the Court.

Mr. Harrison, did you want to say something before I do so?

MR. HARRISON: Please. I apologize, Your Honor. By agreement of counsel, the attorneys, the parties in this case, have agreed to refer to certain individuals by initials. I almost -- in referring to MD, I almost said out loud her full name a few minutes ago. I would ask and make a motion to the Court, if necessary, if the court reporter can modify the transcript.

THE COURT: I will grant your motion and I will direct that the court reporter -- and I did catch that for Mr. Harrison. I know it was unintentional. The reference will be MD and MD only. And to the extent that the court reporter heard a name, I am directing the court reporter not to report that in a transcript if it's -- or to report that at all.

Does that make sense, Ms. Knecht, and is that an appropriate way to handle it for you? So I'll direct you to do so.

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                Was there anything else you wanted to say,
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     Mr. Harrison?
               Nothing further, we shall be adjourned. You all hang
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     on on Zoom and you'll talk.
                (Proceedings adjourned at 5:01 p.m.)
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1 CERTIFICATE 2 I, Cindy L. Knecht, Registered Professional Reporter and 3 Official Reporter of the United States District Court for the 4 Northern District of West Virginia, do hereby certify that the 5 foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings 6 had in the above-styled action on July 21, 2021, as reported by 7 me in stenotypy. I certify that the transcript fees and format comply with 8 9 those prescribed by the Court and the Judicial Conference of the United States. 10 11 Given under my hand this 26th day of July 2021. 12 /s/Cindy L. Knecht 1.3 Cindy L. Knecht, RMR/CRR Official reporter, United States 14 District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24

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